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BIOTECHNOLOGY AND LAW

CRISPR, surrogate licensing,
and scientific discovery
Have research universities abandoned their public focus?
By Jorge L. Contreras1 and
Jacob S. Sherkow2

S

everal institutions are embroiled in
a legal dispute over the foundational
patent rights to CRISPR-Cas9 geneediting technology, and it may take
years for their competing claims to
be resolved (1–4). But even before
ownership of the patents
is finalized, the institutions behind CRISPR have
wasted no time capitalizing on the huge market for
this groundbreaking technology by entering into
a series of license agreements with commercial
enterprises (see the figure). With respect to the
potentially lucrative market for human therapeutics and treatments, each
of the key CRISPR patent
holders has granted exclusive rights to a spinoff or
“surrogate” company formed by the institution and one of its principal researchers
(5, 6). Although this model, in which a university effectively outsources the licensing
and commercialization of a valuable patent portfolio to a private company, is not
uncommon in the world of university technology transfer, we suggest it could rapidly
bottleneck the use of CRISPR technology
to discover and develop useful human
therapeutics.
Several patterns emerge from the web
of transactions shown in the figure (we
make the documents used in our analysis
available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataverse/crisprlicenses). The right to use
CRISPR techniques has been divided into
three broad “fields of use”: (i) basic, noncommercial research; (ii) development
and sale of tools (kits, reagents, and equipment) that aid CRISPR-based gene edit-

ing; and (iii) development, sale, and use of
therapeutics and treatments using CRISPR
techniques. This last field broadly covers
the most commercially significant applications and includes gene editing to develop
agricultural products, veterinary medicine,
and human diagnostics and therapeutics.
Precisely demarcating these fields of
use—especially for a flexible, broadly applicable technology like
CRISPR—and
awarding
appropriate license grants
can be challenging. Nonetheless, the institutions
have largely granted nonexclusive licenses with
respect to noncommercial research and tools
development. This means
that licensees, including
academic researchers, are
permitted to engage in
these activities, but do not
have the right to market
and sell products derived
from their research. It also
means that the CRISPR patent holders are
free to grant licenses for their respective
technologies to other research institutions.
However, in the case of therapeutics and
treatments, with few exceptions, exclusive
licenses to surrogate companies (Editas,
Caribou, or CRISPR Therapeutics) prevent the institution from granting similar
licenses to other companies without the
surrogate’s permission. Caribou’s exclusive license covers all fields of use, and it
has in turn granted an exclusive license in
the field of human therapeutics to Intellia
Therapeutics.

“The institutions
controlling CRISPR
patent rights have
delegated [them]…
to surrogate
companies, which
determine…[who]
will be able to
exploit [them].”
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SURROGATE LICENSING AND CRISPR
The companies to which the patent-holding institutions grant exclusive licenses
effectively stand in as surrogates for the
institutions themselves. These surrogates
control a large and lucrative field for the
exploitation of the licensed technology,
and have significant freedom both to exploit it themselves and to seek partners
and sublicensees. The surrogates take on
the role of the patent owner and retain a
lion’s share of the resulting profits. Many
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rity is compromised in government. They
can fiercely protect university independence. And they can defend peers who become political targets for speaking up (17).
We maintain hope that these concerns
will not be realized. But the scientific community is well positioned for what may lie
ahead. Already, scientific societies have
asked the Trump Administration to appoint
a science adviser and more than 5500 scientists have signed a letter asking the Administration to uphold scientific integrity
(18). Alarms must sound when science is
silenced, manipulated, or otherwise compromised. When science is sidelined from
policy decisions, we all lose. j

In addition, the individual investigators, who often have a substantial equity
interest in the surrogate company, stand to
profit far more than they otherwise would.
For all of these reasons, the surrogate licensing model has become popular with
universities, investigators, and companies
across a wide range of technologies (7, 8).
We reviewed all of the CRISPR surrogate
license agreements made publicly available through filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, requests
under state and federal “freedom-of-information” acts, and through press releases
and public announcements. In each of the
principal surrogate licenses that we reviewed, the patent-holding institution has
granted its surrogate the exclusive right to
use CRISPR to develop human therapeutics targeting any of the 20,000+ genes

CRISPR-CAS9 licensing agreements
Exclusive licenses to surrogates for human therapeutics limit access to CRISPR as a platform technology.
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that comprise the human genome. Because
no single company could develop, test, and
market therapeutics on the basis of even a
fraction of the entire human genome, the
surrogates are authorized and expected to
sublicense their rights to others.
Despite this, it is still unlikely that any
of the surrogate companies could explore a
significant fraction of the potential human
health applications that CRISPR could
enable, even with a range of experienced
commercial partners and collaborators. If
an unlicensed company has the expertise
and wherewithal to develop a novel human therapy using CRISPR—even if that
therapy concerns a previously unexplored
gene—that company might not be able to
obtain the sublicense necessary to undertake this work. In some instances, such as
the license to Editas from the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard, the institution
retains some right to entertain proposals
from other companies if the surrogate is
not pursuing work on a specific gene and
does not plan to do so in the future. The
scope of this limitation, however, is narrow
and still leaves all “unclaimed” portions of
the genome in the surrogate’s hands.
Further, traditional contractual safeguards against overbroad exclusive licenses will likely work poorly under this
model. Diligence milestones, for example,
require an exclusive licensee to demonstrate progress toward commercialization
of a licensed technology (often through the
achievement of various regulatory hurdles,
testing, and trials). But a surrogate can
easily show some progress in some subset
of a broader field to meet this requirement, even if it does not intend to, or cannot, pursue all aspects of the licensed field.
Giving one company an exclusive right to
use CRISPR to develop human therapies
targeting every segment of the human genome could thus limit the creation of potentially beneficial therapies.
NONEXCLUSIVITY AND RESEARCH TOOLS
CRISPR is a broadly applicable, enabling
technology platform, similar in many respects to “research tools”: equipment, reagents, and methods that enable a broad
range of downstream research (9). Exclusive rights in research tools are generally unnecessary for commercialization
of downstream products developed using
them. Rather, exclusive licenses are only
needed with respect to specific therapeutic uses discovered using those tools. For
example, a molecular drug target may be
discovered using research tools like the
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) but then
require considerable and costly product
development, clinical trials, and regulatory
17 FEBRUARY 2017 • VOL 355 ISSUE 6326
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universities prefer this model because it
gives them a substantial share of profits
with minimal risk through, for example,
equity stakes in their researchers’ surrogate companies (7, 8).
The surrogate licensing model, in theory, permits the university to focus on a
broader range of commercialization projects with a limited staff, and delegates the
job of licensing to experts focused on the
relevant technology. Although a university
could license its rights individually to the
range of commercial enterprises illustrated
in the figure, it is often more efficient to
grant rights in bulk to a single company
and let that company scour the market for
viable licensing candidates. The university
profits from its equity interest in the surrogate and from any royalties that are generated by the technology.

approval before it can be marketed (9).
For this reason, in 1999 the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) recommended
that patents on research tools developed using federal funding be licensed
nonexclusively to promote their greatest
utilization, commercialization, and public availability (9). In 2007, eleven major
U.S. research universities—including the
University of California, Berkeley (UCB),
Harvard, and Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), all of which have made
CRISPR patent claims—committed to a
set of core licensing values, known as the
“Nine Points,” one of which states that universities should make patented research
tools as broadly available as possible (10).
Although CRISPR is not necessarily a
“research tool” in that its function is generally not to enable downstream research, it
is a broadly applicable “platform” technology—like stem cells or the Internet—that
could enable innumerable specific applications. To that end, foundational CRISPR
patents, like patents covering research
tools, should be licensed and disseminated
as widely as possible especially when developed with public funding by universities operating in the public interest (11–14).

CAR-T technologies for gene targets chosen by Juno, but that neither Editas nor
Juno have the bandwidth to pursue. In
other instances, overly broad exclusive licenses may hinder research into socially
valuable—but unprofitable—therapeutics,
such as those indicated for rare diseases
or treating illnesses prevalent in disadvantaged populations or regions, a separate
yet equally important principle advanced
in the Nine Points document.
Situations like these—in which exclusive licenses have the potential to extend
beyond that which can be developed—are
precisely what the NIH guidelines and the
Nine Points sought to avoid. Yet the surrogate licensing model adopted by the
CRISPR patent-holding institutions seemingly allows them to circumvent this proscription by ceding licensing authority to
private companies not bound by the guidelines and Nine Points.
RECONCEPTUALIZING CRISPR LICENSING
Given the potential bottlenecks created
by the current surrogate licensing model,
UCB, Harvard, and MIT should broaden
access to CRISPR technology for human
therapeutics. Given that the technology
is developing rapidly and,
in some instances, now being disputed among the
parties, there is still time
to do so. This dynamism in
CRISPR’s patent landscape
should provide the impetus
for these institutions—and
their surrogate companies—
both to amend their existing
agreements and to crosslicense their respective patent rights to one
another. And these cross-licenses need not
be exclusive.
As an example, Broad and UCB could
reserve their rights to license CRISPR to
other commercial firms engaged in therapeutic research on areas of the genome
that their surrogates do not have a reasonable plan to develop. The institutions could
thus open up larger swaths of the genome
to beneficial commercial research. Both
UCB and Broad have recently shown some
attraction to this approach by announcing
limited cross-licensing agreements with
other institutions, albeit not with one another (16, 17). A more flexible licensing approach would result in greater competition
and innovation in the marketplace—in the
spirit of the Nine Points agreement.
The emergence of CRISPR as an important new platform technology should also
prompt NIH to update its guidelines regarding the licensing of federally funded
inventions. Platform technologies such

“Platform technologies such as CRISPR
should be recognized as offering the
same potential for industry-wide
innovation and discovery as traditional
research tools.”
To their credit, the UCB and the Broad
Institute have not sought to limit academic
research through their exclusive CRISPR
licenses (1). Both have made many of their
CRISPR research tools available freely or
cheaply through AddGene, a nonprofit
organization in service of academic and
nonprofit institutions (1, 14). Likewise, as
noted above, the institutions have granted
nonexclusive licenses in the area of tool
development.
But the exclusive licenses granted to
the institutions’ surrogates for human
therapeutics limit access to CRISPR as a
platform technology, potentially hindering competition and creating innovation
bottlenecks. For example, the Broad’s surrogate, Editas, has granted Juno Therapeutics an exclusive license to develop a
host of CRISPR therapies—across multiple
genes—using chimeric antigen receptor T
cell (CAR-T) technology (15). This broad
license threatens to complicate both research and development for CRISPR-based
700

as CRISPR should be recognized as offering the same potential for industry-wide
innovation and discovery as traditional
research tools. A similar updating of, and
recommitment to, the Nine Points may
also be in order.
As the National Academies of Science
have noted, “the first goal of university
technology transfer involving (intellectual property) is the expeditious and wide
dissemination of university-generated
technology for the public good” (12). The
institutions controlling patent rights in
CRISPR have delegated that responsibility
to surrogate companies, which determine
how many or few commercial firms will
be able to exploit it. We urge these institutions to rethink their use of exclusive, surrogate licenses across the entire genome.
Those institutions should ensure that any
exclusive licenses are narrowly drawn to
specific genes, to maximize competition in
the development of the revolutionary technology they have created. j
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